

# Gafka, Savor, and Wilson (2023) - “Sources of return predictability”

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Summary

Comments

Summing up

# Context

- ▶ Asset prices evolve differently on days with macroeconomic announcements (**A-days**) than on days without (**N-days**). On A-days,
  - ▶ timeseries: returns are higher, and so much of the equity risk premium is realized on these days (Savor and Wilson 2013; Ai and Bansal 2018; Ernst, Gilbert, and Hrdlicka 2019)
  - ▶ cross-section: the CAPM fits better (Savor and Wilson 2014), potentially because A-day information releases decrease disagreement between investors (Andrei, Cujean, and Wilson 2023)
- ▶ Gafka, Savor, and Wilson (2023) exploit this A-day vs. N-day dichotomy to tease apart the sources of (timeseries) market return predictability
  - ▶ Their idea is to use time variation in predictive relationships (A-days vs. N-days) to reason about what drives market return predictability
  - ▶ Great idea! Connects to prior work examining business cycle variations in t.s. market return predictability (Cujean and Hasler 2017; Gómez-Cram 2022), on measuring FOMC risk premia (Liu, Tang, and Zhou 2022), and on highlighting short-lived x.s. stock return predictability (Chinco, Clark-Joseph, and Ye 2019;...)

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# Setting

## Defining A-days & N-days

- ▶ A-days: inflation, unemployment & scheduled FOMC interest rate announcements (Savor and Wilson 2013, 2014)
- ▶ N-days: complement of A-days

## Low-frequency predictions

- ▶ Market excess return timeseries are aggregated up from individual log-A-day and log-N-day returns to [quarterly-frequency](#) (typically) returns
- ▶ 48 predictor variables drawn from prior literature, mostly varying at monthly frequency

# Findings

## New empirical facts: N-days are important

1. According to univariate timeseries quarterly return predictive regressions,
  - 1.1 there are more variables that predict N-day returns than variables that predict A-day returns
  - 1.2 mostly, variables predict either one or the other
2. The Shiller (1981) excess volatility puzzle is concentrated on N-days
3. N-day returns are significantly associated with investor (I/B/E/S brokerage) disagreement

## Proposed explanation: investor disagreement

- ▶ A-days: announcements resolve disagreement
- ▶ N-days: disagreement matters; must be linked to predictability
- ▶ Related to the Andrei, Cujean, and Wilson (2023) explanation for different A-day vs. N-day CAPM fits
- ▶ I'll talk more about this mechanism later...

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# 1. Strengthening the predictability results

- ▶ Rather than separate regressions, what happens when you include interaction terms like  $\times \mathbb{1}\{\text{Is N-day}\}_t$ , plus baseline effects (and cluster)? This would let you directly **test for changes** in predictive relationships.
- ▶ Are **out-of-sample** (OOS) and in-sample (IS) results similar?
  - ▶ Norm to also report OOS return predictability; e.g. Welch and Goyal (2008) & Campbell and Thompson (2008)
  - ▶ In-sample tests can be problematic; e.g. Martin and Nagel (2022)
  - ▶ You could compare IS vs. OOS  $R^2$  statistics, or some related measure of the degree of predictability
- ▶ What happens when you use **multivariate** regressions?
  - ▶ “kitchen-sink” approach (Welch and Goyal 2008)
  - ▶ Could use machine learning techniques if concerned about high dimensionality; some even allow for significance testing of coefficients (e.g. ridge regression)
- ▶ Why quarterly returns? Robust to using **monthly**?
- ▶ Table 6, IS univariate regressions: do  $t$ -stats account for potential heteroskedasticity & serial correlation?



## 2. Variation within A-days

### FOMC vs non-FOMC?

- ▶ On FOMC days, the Fed might be revealing its private information about fundamentals (Romer and Romer 2000), but it may simply be responding to news itself (Bauer and Swanson 2023)...
- ▶ ... so financial market participants could be learning about the Fed's policy rule (Bauer, Pflueger, and Sunderam 2022)
- ▶ If the mechanism is indeed about the release of information about fundamentals, all A-day results should be robust to dropping FOMC days

### Variation with uncertainty reduction?

- ▶ Savor and Wilson (2013) document that the VIX, an ex-ante measure of uncertainty, decreases from just before to just after announcements
- ▶ Wachter and Zhu (2022) argue these VIX decreases show uncertainty is being resolved for investors, rather than the price of risk changing
- ▶ How does A-day predictive power vary with A-day  $\Delta VIX$ ?
  - ▶ What about more generally, beyond just A-days?

### 3. Disagreement and predictability (1/2)

- ▶ Following Andrei, Cujean, and Wilson (2023), Section 5 of Gafka, Savor, and Wilson (2023) applies the Law of Total Variance to across-investor  $i$  disagreement, plus assumptions, to arrive at a stock-specific equality:

$$\text{Var}[\tilde{R}^e] = \text{Var}_i[\tilde{R}^e] + \underbrace{\text{Var}[\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}^e]]}_{\text{x.s. mean}} + \underbrace{\text{Var}[\mathbb{E}_i[\tilde{R}^e] - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}^e]]}_{\text{x.s. dispersion}}. \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Aggregating up to market returns, and conditioning on  $t$ ,

$$\text{Var}_t[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] = \text{Var}_{i,t}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] + \text{Var}_t[\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]] + \text{Var}_t[\mathbb{E}_i[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]]. \quad (2)$$

- ▶ Next, Gafka, Savor, and Wilson (2023):

1. go on to plug in the conditional CAPM into Eqn. (2) so that  $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]$  makes an appearance, and then take a simplified version to the data on A-days and N-days, and
2. find that disagreement  $\text{Var}_t[\mathbb{E}_i[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]]$  across investors (I/B/E/S brokerages) is associated only with realized N-day returns.

- ▶ Let's stay within this framework, and focus on Eqn. (2)...

### 3. Disagreement and predictability (2/2)

- ▶ The following is a simple rearrangement of Eqn. (2):

$$\underbrace{\frac{\text{Var}_t[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] - \text{Var}_{i,t}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]}{\text{Var}_t[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]}}_{\text{(i) } R^2, \text{ frac. of return variance explained}} = \underbrace{\frac{\text{Var}_t[\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]]}{\text{Var}_t[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]}}_{\text{(ii) also a frac. of var.}} + \underbrace{\frac{\text{Var}_t[\mathbb{E}_i[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]]}{\text{Var}_t[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]}}_{\text{(iii) x.s. disagreement, normalized}}$$

- ▶ How might we cast the Gafka, Savor, and Wilson (2023) story in terms of the above? Public information releases on **A-days reduce cross-investor disagreement, so term (iii) decreases**, since private info. is crowded-out.
- ▶ Next, how to define return predictability? An investor  $i$  who can predict returns can **achieve some positive  $R^2$ , which is term (i) above**.
- ▶ **N-day results** interpreted from this perspective: when disagreement (iii) is higher, return predictability (i) may be higher, if (ii) is held constant.
- ▶ But can reasoning about investor disagreement tell us why certain variables predict on one day vs. the other?
- ▶ Also, why shouldn't the **public signals** used in this paper affect the **explanatory power of consensus beliefs** ( $1 - (ii) = R^2$ ), in addition to (i)?

## 4. More direct evidence on sources of return predictability

Gafka, Savor, and Wilson (2023): “While *A-day predictors* are driven by future *fundamentals*, *N-day predictors* seem to be predicting the ‘noise’ component of stock market movements.”

- ▶ Both of the above statements can be tested more directly
- ▶ Are A-day predictors actually informative about *A-day macro variable announcements*, even when controlling for professional economists’ forecasts (e.g. SPF, Blue Chip, Bloomberg consensus estimates)?
- ▶ Can you rule out if *N-day predictors might (partly) reveal information* about “fundamentals” that’s then (more fully) revealed on A-days?
  - ▶ For example, extract the residual “noise” component of returns from your Shiller (1981)-style analysis and try to predict that

## Other points

- ▶ What do you mean by “reversals”?
- ▶ Section 5: update notation to clarify vectors vs. scalars, following Andrei, Cujean, and Wilson (2023)
- ▶ Pages 24-25: subscripts  $\{M, t + 1\}$  for returns inconsistent?
- ▶ Empirically reassure that the omitted term  $\text{Var}_t[\overline{\mathbb{E}}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]]$  in eqn. (14) does not enter into the residual when estimating eqn. (15) on the data
- ▶ What exactly is the  $t$  in the empirical proxy of  $\text{Var}_t[\mathbb{E}_i[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e] - \overline{\mathbb{E}}[\tilde{R}_{M,t+1}^e]]$ ?  
i.e. at what point(s)  $t$  is the cross-sectional dispersion calculated: over some look-back prior to the beginning of the quarter?
- ▶ Table 8: why not correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation?

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# Conclusion

- ▶ Promising approach and thought-provoking findings!
- ▶ Additional analyses could help us better understand what is driving both A-day and N-day predictability
- ▶ How important actually is investor disagreement as an explanation for the A-day vs. N-day dichotomy?

Good luck!



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